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NATURAL GAS REGULATION AND
MARKET DISORDER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasingly tumultuous natural gas markets are presenting
problems to both the natural gas industry and those who depend upon
it. One need not search far to find the problems' symptoms. Within
the past year, interstate pipelines have paid more than ten dollars per
million British thermal unit (MMBtu) l for natural gas, a record price
which is more than five times the average price existing prior to the
passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA).2 Yet many of
these pipelines have seen their markets in the industrial North evapo-
rate suddenly because of the deep national recession and unexpectedly
strong competition from residual fuel oil.3 Moreover, they have found
it increasingly difficult to persuade distributors and state regulatory
commissions that residential and commercial consumers should accept
additional price increases.4 In at least one instance, a gas distributor
notified its pipeline suppliers that it will no longer honor the minimum
bill provisions of their tariffs.5
Faced with declining demand, the interstate pipelines have turned
toward markets in Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and elsewhere which
The practicing attorney who wrote this Article wishes to remain anonymous.
1. DIVISION OF ENERGY DEREGULATION, OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AND ANALYSIS,
U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, A STUDY OF ALTERNATIVES TO THE NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT OF 1978
3 (1981) [hereinafter cited as NGPA ALTERNATIVES].
2. Sections 2 to 602, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. V 1981).
3. See, e.g., Foster Nat. Gas Rep., Dec. 29, 1982, at 9 (No. 1395); Foster Nat. Gas Rep.,
Aug. 12, 1982, at 1 (No. 1376) (summary of testimony of United Distribution Companies). Inside
F.E.R.C., Apr. 19, 1982, at 3. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. provided a dramatic example of this
trend when it informed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that it had lost two-
thirds of its jurisdictional sales. Foster Nat. Gas Rep., Dec. 16, 1982, at 19 (No. 1394).
4. Last fall, voters in several industrial states-most notably Michigan-approved referenda
authorizing state public service commissions to combat escalating gas prices. See State Regulators
Take Up Battle Against Rising Natural Gas Prices, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1983, at 25, col. 4; Foster
Nat. Gas Rep., Dec. 16, 1982, at 1 (No. 1394).
5. Inside F.E.R.C., Oct. 25, 1982, at I (repudiation by Columbia Gas Transmission of mini-
mum bill provisions in suppliers' tariffs). A minimum bill provision in a tariff requires a distribu-
tor to make a minimum monthly payment to its supplier, regardless of the amount of gas which is
actually delivered.
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have traditionally been served by intrastate pipelines. Not surprisingly,
the intrastate pipelines have denounced these attempts as "market raid-
ing," claiming that the NGPA gives interstate pipelines unfair advan-
tages in obtaining new supplies and competing for industrial markets.6
Producers have also suffered since both interstate and intrastate pipe-
lines have stopped purchasing gas and have been increasingly reluctant
to honor contractual take-or-pay commitments.7 These contracts were
made during the 1970's when consumers had a seemingly boundless
appetite for new gas supplies.'
The wellhead price deregulation of approximately sixty percent of
the nation's natural gas supplies, which is now scheduled to occur Jan-
uary 1, 1985,1 will further disrupt natural gas markets. Because of
lower aggregate demand for energy, the prospects for a sharp increase
of natural gas prices upon deregulation, commonly referred to as a
"fly-up," have substantially declined. However, the world market for
energy is dynamic, changing abruptly in response to disruptions of sup-
ply and shifts in demand. Accordingly, there is no assurance that
prices will remain stable over the next two years. Even if prices were to
remain stable, indefinite escalation clauses and favored nations clauses
in gas sales contracts could still create a fly-up upon deregulation.' 0
The crisis in the gas markets has not gone unnoticed in Washing-
ton. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)" issued a
notice of inquiry last spring to "investigate allegations that serious eco-
nomic distortions may be evolving in the nation's natural gas mar-
kets."' 2 Dozens of bills addressing aspects of the market disorder
problems are already before Congress, and the current session will un-
doubtedly bring the introduction of dozens more. Proposals currently
under consideration range from the extremes of total wellhead price
decontrol to price freezes and even rollbacks. ' 3 The consensus on natu-
6. See Inside F.E.R.C., Oct. 18, 1982, at 1.
7. Under a take-or-pay gas purchase contract, the buyer may refuse to take his agreed quan-
tity, but will still be required to pay a percentage ofits cost. See infra notes 45-48 and accompany-
ing text.
8. See M. SANDERS, THE REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS 125 (1981).
9. NGPA § 121.
10. NGPA ALTERNATIVFS, srupra note 1, at 65.
11. FERC was created in 1977 by the Department of Energy Organization Act (DOE Act),
Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 (Supp. V 1981)). FERC is in
essence the successor of the now defunct Federal Power Commission (FPC). See 42 U.S.C. § 7172
(Supp. V 1981) (transferring functions and personnel from the FPC to the FERC). In this Article,
the term "Commission" shall be used when referring to both entities.
12. Notice of Inquiry, 47 Fed. Reg. 19,157 (1982).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 124-60.
[Vol. 18:619
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ral gas policy is that there is no consensus.
This Article will argue that the turmoil in the natural gas markets
is primarily a result of federal policy. Natural gas policy is now poised
between the comprehensive price control scheme of previous law and
the strange new world of deregulation, towards which the industry has
been hesitantly moving for the past decade. In essence, all areas of the
law contain elements of both freedom and restraint and the natural gas
industry is not exempt from that principle. Yet the current hodgepodge
of freedom and restraint that characterizes federal energy policy cannot
long endure.
If federal energy policy is in crisis, then opportunities will be
presented as well as dangers. Federal controls on wellhead prices have
had a destabilizing effect on the nation's industries and residences for
more than forty years. Accordingly, the current gas glut presents an
ideal opportunity for the deregulation of wellhead natural gas prices
and the introduction of reforms designed to bring economic rationality
to gas markets. Previous experience with price decontrol of crude oil
and refined petroleum products suggests that gas decontrol could occur
without the danger of any price fly-up. Only relatively minor regula-
tory adjustments would be necessary to provide for an orderly transi-
tion to a completely deregulated market.' 4 A tax on the "windfall," if
any, accruing to producers upon deregulation could serve no useful
purpose and should be resisted.' 5 Though deregulation of wellhead
prices would be helpful, additional measures are necessary to restore
order to gas markets. Federal policy should encourage pipelines to ob-
tain gas supplies at the lowest possible cost. Moreover, serious consid-
eration should be given to imposing common carrier status on
pipelines, with a view to simulating if not actually establishing a spot
market for natural gas. Such a course may lead to administrative com-
plexity and additional regulatory burdens in the short run, but these
problems may merely be the price of progress.
Beginning with a general discussion on the market for natural gas
and the structure of the industry, this Article will review the history of
natural gas regulation under both the Natural Gas Act of 1938
(NGA) 16 and the NGPA. After demonstrating that federal regulation
has been largely responsible for the disorder in the natural gas markets,
14. See infra text accompanying notes 161-62.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 117-22.
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976).
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this Article will conclude with an examination and evaluation of the
most important solutions.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY
A. The Natural Gas Markets
Natural gas provides approximately one-fourth of all energy con-
sumed in the United States, ranking second only to oil as an energy
source.'" Although natural gas is used in a number of ways, its primary
use is in residential and commercial furnaces and industrial boilers. 18
The leading residential fuel in most regions of the country except the
Northeast, where oil is dominant, and the Pacific Northwest, where hy-
droelectric power is dominant, natural gas heats over fifty-five percent
of the nation's houses and a substantial number of its businesses.' 9
Electricity has recently gained a greater share of the residential heating
market largely because of the lower installation costs and the morato-
rium on natural gas hookups which state utility commissions imposed
after the severe natural gas shortages of the 1970's.10
Industrial uses of natural gas fall into three broad categories:
feedstock, process uses, and boiler fuel. Use of natural gas as feedstock
means that it is used as a raw material rather than as fuel.2' Process
uses refer to the use of natural gas heat in the processing of some prod-
uct and may vary widely. Many who use gas in processing depend
upon it as a fuel because of its clear, direct flame of precisely controlla-
ble temperature with immediate warm-up and cool-down. 22 In boilers,
natural gas is burned to produce steam for mechanical or processing
purposes or for the generation of electricity. 23
Electric utilities, particularly those located in Texas, Louisiana,
California, Oklahoma, and Kansas, are the largest industrial users of
natural gas, using eighteen percent of the total production in 1978.24
17. ECONOMIC REGULATORY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NATURAL GAS kATE DESIGN
STUDY 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ERA STUDY].
18. Id. at 7.
19. Id. at 9.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 10. Examples of products made with natural gas are ammonia and carbon black.
Id.
22. Id. For such industrial uses as food processing, glass and ceramic manufacturing, and
textiles drying, natural gas is superior to other fuels. Id.
23. Id. The use of natural gas as boiler fuel constitutes "the largest portion of natural gas in
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Together, the chemical industry, iron and steel manufacturers, food
and fertilizer producers, metal products fabricators, and petroleum re-
finers consumed another forty percent of the total.25 The installation
costs of facilities which can use alternate fuels, primarily residual fuel
oil, are relatively low for industrial consumers; thus they are extremely
sensitive to price differentials among competing fuels, 26 and could be
expected to shift fuels if fly-up were to occur. Overall, approximately
twenty-eight percent of the natural gas produced in 1978 was ulti-
mately consumed by residential users while thirteen percent was con-
sumed commercially.27
B. The Structure of the Industry
The natural gas industry consists of three segments: production,
transmission, and distribution.2 8 Gas is produced at the wellhead,
transmitted through pipelines, and distributed to customers. Each of
these activities is discussed in greater detail below.
1. Production
Natural gas is brought to market from wells drilled to gas-bearing
strata which may be far beneath the earth's surface. 29 While the pri-
mary component of natural gas is methane, it is not uncommon for it to
contain other hydrocarbons such as ethane, propane, butane, and pen-
tane. These "natural gas liquids," which are valuable chemical feed-
stock and have a number of other commercial uses, are gaseous while
under high pressure in the reservoir but condense to liquid form upon
reaching the surface and passing through separators3 0
The costs of natural gas production are high, including lease ac-
quisition, geological analysis of prospects, seismic exploration, and
drilling. It is not rare for the costs of a single well to exceed one million
dollars, and wells drilled to extraordinary depths or under difficult cir-
cumstances, such as those drilled in offshore Alaskan waters, may cost
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 9.
28. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV. AND NAT'L REGULATORY RESEARCH INST., 97TH
CONG., 2D SESs., NATURAL GAS REGULATION STUDY 17 (Comm. Print 1982) (prepared for the
Subcomm. on Fossil and Synthetic Fuels of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce) [herein-
after cited as NATURAL GA REGULATION STUDY].
29. Wells drilled to depths of 20,000 feet or more are not uncommon. See id. at 96.
30. Id. at 96-70.
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over eight million dollars.3 Moreover, a large number of wells are un-
successful; while a producer may use sophisticated exploration tech-
niques to reduce risks, there is never assurance of finding additional
reserves.
Natural gas is found in many states. However, six states-Texas,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Kansas, and California-account for
more than two-thirds of United States production. 32 The largest natu-
ral gas producers are the major integrated oil companies; the twenty
largest natural gas producers account for about half of all sales at the
wellhead.33 However, thousands of small, independent gas producers
compete with the majors in the search for new reserves. 34
2. Transmission
Pipeline companies transport natural gas from the field to urban
distribution companies at the "city gate" or, in some cases, directly to
industrial consumers. 35 Natural gas transmission is extremely expen-
sive, requiring networks of seamless steel pipe and compressor stations
that must be constructed under difficult circumstances across inhospita-
ble terrain.36 The transmission segment of the industry has elements of
both monopoly and monopsony; a city may be served by only one in-
terstate pipeline, which may, in turn, be the sole gas purchaser from
several fields. 37 It is therefore generally believed that the transmission
segment of the industry displays most of the characteristics of a natural
monopoly, although some commentators have vociferously disagreed
with this conclusion.38
31. OIL & GAS J., Mar. 16, 1981, at 43.
32. ERA STUDY, supra note 17, at 7.
33. NATURAL GAS REGULATION STUDY, supra note 28, at 19.
34. Id.
35. Prior to being transported, the gas is usually treated for impurities such as sulfur, carbon
dioxide, and water vapor, and processed for removal of natural gas liquids. See NATURAL GAS
REGULATION STUDY, supra note 28, at 97-98.
36. Pipeline construction costs of $1 million per mile are not uncommon, and are much
higher for pipelines of larger diameters (i.e., 32 inches or more) and offshore pipelines. See OIL &
GAS J., Nov. 22, 1982, at 73, 78 (annual pipeline issue).
37. For a discussion of the monopolistic tendencies of natural gas transmission, see M. SAND-
ERS, supra note 8, at 17-45.
38. The conventional wisdom on natural gas pipelines may be found in id. See also NATU-
RAL GAS REGULATION STUDY, supra note 28, at 132-38, 166-71. The dissenting viewpoint may be
found in Tussing & Barlow, The Rise and Fall of Regulation In the Natural Gas Industry, PuB.
UTIL. FORT., Mar. 4, 1982, at 15-23. For a more scholarly and less tendentious discussion of the
subject, see 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 152-71 (1971).
[Vol. 18:619
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3. Distribution
Distributors transport natural gas from the city gate and deliver it
to the burner tip for consumption by residential, commercial, and in-
dustrial users. Many of these customers purchase gas under inter-
ruptible service contracts, subject to tariffs established either by
municipal ordinance or state utility commission order.39 Distribution
companies are generally considered to be natural monopolies, since
economies of scale make it inefficient for more than one such company
to operate within a given city.40
C. Market Structure
To an extent unmatched by other markets, the structure of the nat-
ural gas market is determined by the nature of the commodity itself.4
Unlike oil, natural gas is extremely difficult to store and, unless lique-
fied at great cost, can be transported to market only by pipeline. This
latter characteristic is particularly important because the demand for
natural gas is subject to sharp seasonal fluctuations, with peak demand
occurring from October through March.42
Long-term purchase contracts have made the marketing of gas
possible by assuring the revenues necessary to recover the initial invest-
ment in pipeline facilities. Contract terms of ten to twenty years are
now the most common, although in earlier times contracts frequently
lasted for the length of the producer's leases.43 Because of their long
duration, gas contracts include a number of special provisions designed
to provide both purchaser and seller with the flexibility to meet chang-
ing market conditions, while maintaining a stable framework of pre-
dictable rights and duties. The most important of these provisions will
be discussed below.44
39. NATURAL GAS REGULATION STUDY, supra note 28, at 34-35.
40. Id. at 132-38; see 2 A. KAHN, supra note 38, at 152-71.
41. An early oil and gas decision eloquently summarized the peculiar characteristics of natu-
ral gas.
Water and oil, and still more strongly gas, may be classed by themselves, .. as miner-
alsferae naturae. In common with animals, and unlike other minerals, they have the
power and the tendency to escape without the volition of the owner. Their "fugitive and
wandering existence within the limits of a particular tract was uncertain,"....
Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 236, 18 A. 724, 725 (1889)
(quoting Brown v. Vandergrift, 80 Pa. 142, 147-48 (1875)).
42. NATURAL GAS REGULATION STUDY, supra note 28, at 18.
43. For a general discussion of this point, see Pierce, Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation,
and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63 (1982).
44. The ensuing discussion, infra text accompanying notes 45-57, is heavily indebted to
Pierce, supra note 43, at 78-82.
1983]
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1. Take-or-Pay Clauses
In general, a "take-or-pay" clause requires the purchaser to pay
for a specified minimum percentage of the quantity of gas which the
seller's wells can physically produce, regardless of whether the pur-
chaser actually buys ("takes") the gas.4 5 That minimum is usually be-
tween seventy and eighty percent,4 6 although it may be as high as
ninety percent for offshore wells. Also, pipelines generally agree to
take all of a producer's "casinghead" or "oil well" gas, which would
otherwise have to be flared in violation of state conservation laws.
The take-or-pay clause is beneficial to a producer because it as-
sures his cash flow, thereby reducing his risk and facilitating the financ-
ing of further exploration. The take-or-pay clause is also beneficial to
pipelines because it permits them to curtail their takes without incur-
ring contractual liability or jeopardizing their continued access to the
producer's reserves.47 In the absence of such a clause, the pipeline
would be liable to the producer for an amount equal to the excess of
the contract price over the market price for gas contracted for but not
taken.48
2. Price-Escalation Clauses
During the early days of the gas industry, inflation rates were low
and gas was seen as little more than a byproduct of oil production.
Markets were stable, oil was relatively inexpensive, and many fields
had only one pipeline outlet. These circumstances led producers to
sign long-term fixed price contracts under which gas was sold for only
pennies per MMBtu. 49
During the 1960's, however, rising inflation and the increasing
scarcity of natural gas allowed producers to include price-escalation
clauses in their contracts.50 There are two general types of such
clauses: fixed escalation clauses and indefinite escalation clauses.
Fixed clauses establish a base price and a predetermined yearly escala-
tion rate,51 while indefinite escalation clauses tie the contract price to
45. Id. at 78.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 78-79.
48. Id. Pierce notes that § 2-708 of the Uniform Commercial Code sets the measure of dam-
ages as "the difference between the market price at the time and place for tender and the unpaid
contract price." Id. at 79 n.63.
49. Id. at 79-80.
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the price of some other product outside of the contract itself. Common
indefinite escalation clauses are two- and three-party "favored nations"
clauses,52 "area rate" or "NGPA" clauses,53 and "oil equivalency"
clauses.5 4 Both take-or-pay and indefinite escalator clauses permit the
adaptation of long-term contracts to changing markets, whereas a
fixed-escalation clause simply adjusts the price according to the future
market conditions which the .parties expected when the contract was
made. However, even take-or-pay and indefinite escalator clauses may
in some instances freeze arrangements that no longer reflect market
conditions.5
3. Other Contractual Provisions
Two additional types of clauses are worthy of mention. The first,
known as a "market-out" clause, gives the purchaser the right to reduce
the price which it currently pays for gas to one at which it believes the
gas can be marketed. The seller then has the option of accepting the
new offer or terminating the contract and seeking a new purchaser. 6
The circumstances under which the purchaser may exercise its market-
out rights depend upon the terms of the contract. Some of these con-
tracts may give the purchaser broad discretion, while others specify ob-
jective market conditions, such as the price of competing fuels, under
which the market-out provision may be invoked. Market-out clauses
are a relatively recent development, thus many current gas purchase
contracts are without them. 7
"Price redetermination" clauses have also appeared in gas
52. A two-party favored nations clause. . . provides that if the buyer purchases gas in
the same field or area at a higher price than is paid under the contract in question, it
must thereafter pay to seller the same price it is paying to other sellers. A third-party
favored nations clause provides that the buyer will pay seller a price equal to the highest
price paid by any buyer to any seller in the same field or area.
8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW 439 (1982).
53. "Area rate" and "NGPA" clauses provide that the seller shall receive a contract price
equal to the maximum legal selling price prescribed by law. Area rate clauses were used when the
FPC established maximum legal prices under the NGA with reference to producers' rates of re-
turn on regionally averaged investment costs. See id. at 39; infra notes 72-88 and accompanying
text. NGPA clauses replaced area rate clauses after the passage of the NGPA.
54. An "oil equivalency" clause establishes the price for gas with reference to either No. 2
fuel oil or No. 6 fuel oil, which compete with natural gas for a share of the industrial energy
market. See 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAw 27 (Supp. Nov. 1982).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 120, 129-30.
56. Several interstate pipelines have already invoked market-out clauses, thereby running the
risk of losing reserves in an effort to meet the competition for the industrial market provided by
No. 2 and No. 6 fuel oils. See Inside F.E.R.C., June 14, 1982, at 1 (Michigan-Wisconsin exercis-
ing market-out option and offering new price of $6/MMBtu).
57. For further discussion of market-out clauses, see infra text accompanying note 129.
1983]
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purchase contracts with increasing frequency. Such clauses provide
that in the event of deregulation the price will be renegotiated. The
new price may be established with reference to the local gas market,
but is not bound by that factor. Moreover, the producer may have the
option of selling his gas to another purchaser, subject to the original
buyer's right of first refusal. Since these clauses are appearing in gas
purchase contracts with greater frequency, it is not inconceivable that
immediate deregulation would lead to lower prices negotiated on the
basis of current market conditions, rather than those existing at the
time the original contract was made.
III. FEDERAL REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS MARKETS
This section will examine federal regulation of both producers and
pipelines in order to determine the effect of regulation on natural gas
markets. A discussion of current regulations will begin after a brief
examination of the origins of federal regulation. The section will then
conclude with an analysis of some of the inefficiencies which the pres-
ent regulatory scheme appears to have caused.
A. The History of Natural Gas Regulation
During the late nineteenth century, natural gas was considered a
waste product of oil production, and was usually flared at the well
site. 8 However, it was not long before entrepreneurs in the oil produc-
ing communities realized the value of natural gas as a source of heating
and lighting. These distribution companies soon became subject to reg-
ulation by state commissions as legal monopolies.
As technology advanced, pipeline companies were able to extend
their markets beyond oil-producing regions to communities nation-
wide.5 9 However, this transmission of gas from one state to another
was deemed by the Supreme Court to be interstate commerce which
could not be regulated by the individual states.60 Therefore, prompted
in 1938 by the disruptions inherent to an incompletely regulated indus-
try, Congress instituted federal regulation by passing the Natural Gas
Act.61
58. See M. SANDERS, supra note 8, at 24-25; Connole, General Considerations." A Nation'r
Natural-Gas Pains, 44 GEo. L.J. 555, 555-57 (1956).
59. See M. SANDERS, supra note 8, at 25.
60. Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924).
61. For a detailed technical discussion of the NGA's legislative history, see Note, Legislative
History of the Natural Gas Act, 44 GEo. L.J. 695 (1956).
[Vol. 18:619
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The NGA gave broad power to the Federal Power Commission
(FPC) over a number of transactions, although the grant of jurisdiction
was not extended to the limits of Congress' powers under the commerce
clause, even as those powers were construed in the 1930's.61 Under the
NGA, a "natural-gas company"63 is allowed to charge no more than is
"just and reasonable," which means rates must be cost-based. Further-
more, gas companies were required to obtain certificates of public con-
venience and necessity before beginning sales involving interstate
commerce, and could only abandon such sales after having first ob-
tained the Commission's consent.64
While the NGA imposed a pervasive scheme of federal regulation
on natural gas pipelines, the regulatory status of independent producers
was ambiguous and remained so until 1954.65 Natural gas distributors
were generally exempt from the Commission's NGA jurisdiction be-
cause they were believed to be adequately regulated by state utility
commissions. While in recent years distributors have become more
subject to indirect regulation, a discussion of such regulation is beyond
the scope of this Article.66
B. Pipeline Regulation Under the NGA
The FPC has adopted a cost-of-service approach which permits
interstate pipelines to charge rates to recover taxes, depreciation, oper-
ating expenses, energy and other costs, as well as an acceptable return
on the net investment.67 Pipeline customer rates are allocated between
a "demand charge" and a "commodity charge." The demand charge is
a payment for the right to purchase gas from the pipeline and the com-
62. Under the NGA, the FPC's jurisdiction extends to:
the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate com-
merce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commer-
cial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such
transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural
gas or to the local distribution of natural gas to the facilities used for such distribution or
to the production or gathering of natural gas.
NGA § l(b).
63. The NGA defines "natural-gas company" as "a person engaged in the transportation of
natural gas in interstate commerce, or the sale in interstate commerce of such gas for resale."
NGA § 2(7).
64. NGA § 4 (rates and charges); NGA § 7 (certification of convenience and necessity and
abandonment of service).
65. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
66. For a detailed discussion of the regulation of distribution companies, see NATURAL GAS
REGULATION STUDY, supra note 28, at 195-297.
67. See generally I A. KAHN, supra note 38, at 20-57 (1970) (discussing factors considered in
setting prices for public utility services based on costs of service).
1983]
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modity charge is simply a payment for the amount of gas actually
purchased. 8 Both charges are set at a level sufficient to recover the
pipeline's costs over the quantity of gas which it expects to sell.69
This rate design has led to serious distortions in the burner-tip
price of gas7" by generally permitting pipelines to operate in what is
essentially a cost-plus environment. In return for having a relatively
low ceiling placed on profits, pipelines are virtually assured of passing
all service costs on to ratepayers.71 Pipelines, therefore, have little in-
centive to minimize these costs, particularly since purchased gas adjust-
ment clauses in their tariffs ensure that increased energy costs will be
promptly picked up by consumers.
C. Regulation of Producers
1. Regulation Under the NGA
During the 1940's, the Supreme Court dispelled any doubt con-
cerning the NGA's applicability to wellhead prices charged by produ-
cers affiliated with interstate pipelines.72 However, in 1954 the Court
concluded in effect that the NGA also required the FPC to regulate
wellhead natural gas prices charged by independent producers.73
The FPC, somewhat reluctantly thrust into uncharted waters by
the Court's decision, attempted to set rates for hundreds of producers
on an individual basis, using traditional cost-based rate-making crite-
ria.74 Overwhelmed by the staggering administrative burdens imposed
by this method, the FPC abandoned it in favor of "area rate" regula-
tion.75 Under this method, the FPC based the producers' rate of return
68. Pierce, supra note 43, at 83.
69. Id. Fixed costs are primarily allocated to the commodity charge, while variable costs are
done so exclusively. Id. The use of energy comprises the largest component of variable costs and
its costs are determined by calculating a weighted average of the pipeline's gas purchase prices.
Id.
70. See infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
72. See Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 597-604 (1945) (FPC may con-
sider production properties and gathering facilities of natural gas companies in setting rates under
the NGA).
73. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 682-85 (1954) (FPC may regulate
prices of independent gas producers that sell to interstate pipelines).
74. See Note, Legislative History ofthe Natural Gas Policy Act: Title I, 59 TEX. L. REv. 101,
108 (1980). See generally id. at 107-12 (describing FPC's various pricing strategies under the
NGA).
75. Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, 24 F.P.C. 818 (1960) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 2.56
(1982)). When the FPC initiated area rate proceedings in 1960, it was estimated that there were
4500 natural gas producers in business. C. HAWKINS, THE FIELD REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS
37 (1969). To the surprise of no one, the FPC estimated that it would not achieve current status in
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on industry-wide production and regionally averaged investment costs,
thereby avoiding the burdensome task of setting prices for individual
producer sales.76  The FPC also initiated a two-tier pricing system
designed to stimulate production without permitting a "windfall" to
producers of already-flowing gas.77 Accordingly, the higher ceiling
covered "new" gas from gas wells, and the lower ceiling applied to both
"old" gas from gas wells and to "associated gas," meaning all gas from
oil wells. 8 While upholding both the area rate and two-tier ceiling
methodologies in the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,79 the Supreme
Court made the following observation: "Producers of natural gas can-
not usefully be classed as public utilities. . . .The value to the public
of the services they perform is measured by the quantity and character
of the natural gas they produce, and not by the resources they have
expended in its search . "80o
Shortly after the Permian Basin decision, the FPC began to investi-
gate the possibilities of establishing a unified national price for pro-
ducer sales of natural gas.8" This investigation culminated in 1974
when the FPC set a national ceiling price of $.42 per thousand cubic
feet (Mcf) for gas from wells commenced on or after January 1, 1973.82
The FPC's action, intended as an incentive for the production of new
gas, was consistent with the policies underlying the two-tier pricing sys-
tem. 3 After having established this "national rate," the FPC set two
other national rates for new gas: $.50 per Mcf in December 1974 and
$1.42 per Mcf in 1977. The FPC also experimented with regulatory
its independent producer case load until the year 2043. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537, 546
(1960), afrdsub noma. Wisconsin v. FPC, 303 F.2d 380, af'd, 373 U.S. 294 (1963).
76. Area Rate Proceeding for Permian Basin, 34 F.P.C. 159, 189-208 (1965), aff'd inpart and
rev'd in part sub nom. Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC, 375 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1967), afdinpart andrev'din
part sub norm. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 755 (1968) (approving FPC decision
in its entirety). For a detailed discussion of area ratemaking, see Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural
Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas Producers, 86 HARv. L. REv. 941, 958-65 (1973).
77. See Note, supra note 74, at 109. For a discussion of the economic theory underlying the
two-tier system, see Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 76, at 948-52.
78. See Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 76, at 959.
79. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
80. 390 U.S. at 756-57. Similarly, the FPC had suggested abandonment of cost-based utility
ratemaking principles in establishing maximum permissible producer prices as early as 1956.
[1956] F.P.C. ANN. REP. 19.
81. See Initial Rates for Future Sales of Natural Gas, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,638 (1970). The FPC's
decision to abandon area ratemaking was dictated in part by the conceptual problems inherent in
the scheme. See Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 76, at 958-65.
82. Opinion No. 699, 51 F.P.C. 2212, 2215, 2281-82 (1974).
83. See [1971] F.P.C. ANN. REP. 36 (justifying price incentives offered to producers by the
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approaches that were less restrictive than those sanctioned under tradi-
tional utility ratemaking procedures. 4
Unfortunately, these approaches were insufficient to correct the
problems inherent in regulating producer prices under the NGA. The
cost-based ratemaking methodology which the NGA mandates and its
corollary emphasis on consumer protection led the FPC to fix ceiling
prices for natural gas far below market-clearing levels.85 At such
prices, the demand for natural gas greatly exceeded the available inter-
state supply and thus caused severe shortages and pipeline curtail-
ments.86 Moreover, the FPC's jurisdiction extended only to sales of
natural gas in the interstate market.87 Not even upper-tier FPC ceiling
prices were sufficient to attract the necessary supplies away from the
unregulated intrastate market.88 This arbitrary regulatory distinction
only worsened the already acute shortage of gas in the interstate
market.
2. Regulation Under the NGPA
The NGA's failure to assure adequate gas supplies at reasonable
prices for the interstate market led to the adoption of the NGPA. 89 Ti-
tle 19° of the NGPA establishes statutory maximum prices for both in-
terstate and intrastate "first sales" of natural gas.91 These prices are
determined with reference to eight major categories and numerous sub-
84. See Note, supra note 74, at 111. For example, the FPC began to accept the discounted
cash flow (DCF) pricing method in determining producer costs. This method attempted to simu-
late the free market by imitating the economic behavior of gas producers. For a detailed explana-
tion of DCF analysis in oil and gas production, see S. MCDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION
IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 76-82 (1971); W. LOVEJOY & P. HOMAN, ECO-
NOMIC ASPECTS OF OIL CONSERVATION REGULATION 90-93 (1967).
85. See Note, supra note 74, at 112; Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 76, at 968-76.
86. H.R. REP. No. 496, pt. 4, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 90, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 8454, 8534; see also North Carolina v. FERC, 584 F.2d 1003 (1978) (curtailment levels
of 40%). For a discussion of the economic theory underlying the relationship between shortages
and insufficiently high prices, see Note, Production Bounties/or New' Natural Gas in Times of
Shortage, 58 TEx. L. REV. 197, 203-05 (1979).
87. NGA § 1(b) (quoted at supra note 62).
88. See supra note 86.
89. See Note, supra note 74. For a discussion of the legislative maneuvering that led to the
NGPA's adoption, see Hollis & Strobl, Squaring the Circle: Implementing the Agricultural Use
Exemption From Incremental Pricing Under the Natural Gas PolicyAct, 15 NAT. RESOURCES LAW.
419, 419 n.3 (1982).
90. NGPA §§ 101-123.
91. Id. §§ 101-109. Id. § 2(21) defines "first sale" as follows:
(A) General rule
The term "first sale" means any sale of any volume of natural gas-
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categories of natural gas production.92 A volume of gas is categorized
according to the rate at which it is produced,93 the geological formation
from which it is produced,94 and a number of other factors.95  In es-
sence, however, "first sales" fall into two classes: those which require a
jurisdictional agency to determine whether the subject gas qualifies for
collection of the statutorily-prescribed maximum price and those for
which no such determination is necessary.96  These categories can be
(i) to any interstate pipeline or intrastate pipeline;
(ii) to any local distribution company;
(iii) to any person for use by such person;
(iv) which precedes any sale described in clauses (i), (ii), or (iii); and
(v) which precedes or follows any sale described in clauses (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv)
and is defined by the Commission as a first sale in order to prevent circumvention of
any maximum lawful price established under this chapter.
(B) Certain sales not included
Clauses (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) of subparagraph (A) shall not include the sale of any
volume of natural gas by any interstate pipeline, intrastate pipeline, or local distribution
company, or any affiliate thereof, unless such sale is attributable to volumes of natural
gas produced by such interstate pipeline, intrastate pipeline, or local distribution com-
pany, or any affiliate thereof.
There can be numerous first sales of the same volume of gas under this definition. For example,
when a producer sells to a gatherer who in turn sells to a processor who eventually sells to a
pipeline, there may be three first sales of the same gas. See 18 C.F.R. § 270.202(a) (1981); Letter
Opinion to Pronto Compression Co. (Mar. 12, 1980), [FERC Actions] NGPA INF. SERV. (FPAS)
4361; see also Hollis, Title I and Related Producer Matters Under the NGPA, 2 ENERGY L. SERV.
(CALLAGHAN) § 4D.02 at 2 (Apr. 1981) (outlining first sale rule). Under certain circumstances, a
producer's maximum legal selling prices in first sales may be increased to permit recovery of
certain production related costs and state severance taxes. NGPA § 110(a).
92. See NGPA §§ 102-109.
93. E.g., id. § 108(b)(1)(A) (establishing category for stripper well gas, produced at rate not in
excess of 60 Mcf per day and subject to certain limitations).
94. For example, "high-cost" natural gas is defined as follows:
(c) Definition of high-cost natural gas
For purposes of this section, the term "high-cost natural gas" means natural gas
determined in accordance with section 3413 of this title [NGPA § 5031 to be-
(1) produced from any well the surface drilling of which began on or after
February 19, 1977, if such production is from a completion location which is located at
a depth of more than 15,000 feet;
(2) produced from geopressured brine;
(3) occluded natural gas produced from coal seams;
(4) produced from Devonian shale, and
(5) produced under such other conditions as the Commission determines to
present extraordinary risks or costs.
.d. § 107(c).
95. See, ag., id. § 103 (gas produced from a reservoir from which there was no production in
commercial quantities before Apr. 20, 1977); id. § 104 (gas committed or dedicated to interstate
commerce prior to enactment of NGPA and subject to rates established under the NGA); id. § 105
(gas sold under intrastate contracts on NGPA enactment date). Congress, in its wisdom, even
devised a category for gas that did not qualify for any other NGPA category. See id. § 109. For a
general discussion of the title I pricing scheme, see Hollis, supra note 91.
96. The categories in the first class are: (1) new natural gas, NGPA § 102(c)(1)(A)-(C);
(2) certain natural gas produced from the Outer Continental Shelf, id. § 102(d); (3) new, onshore
production wells, id. § 103; (4) high cost natural gas, id. § 107; (5) stripper well natural gas, id.
§ 108. The categories in the second class are (1) gas dedicated to interstate commerce, id. § 104;
15
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seen as a complicated variation of the old NGA two-tier pricing
scheme. 97 The first class corresponds to the upper tier which was eligi-
ble for incentive prices, and the second class corresponds to the lower
tier of "old" and low-cost gas.98 Thus, the NGPA discarded the NGA's
distinction between interstate and intrastate sales as well as its cost-
based ratemaking methodology, but continued to give favorable price
treatment to new and high-cost gas as a spur to greater production.
Title I of the NGPA also provides for an eventual partial deregu-
lation of wellhead prices. Gas falling within the four categories out-
lined in NGPA section 107(a)-(d) has been exempt from price ceilings
since November 9, 1979.99 Moreover, section 12 1(a) of the NGPA pro-
vides for the removal of title I price ceilings for gas in three additional
categories beginning January 1, 1985.11 However, NGPA sections 121
and 122 provide that after six months either the President or Congress
may reimpose controls of these three categories for a period of eighteen
months, to begin not later than June 30, 1987.101 Already flowing gas,
which falls into the various categories set forth in sections 104-106 and
109 of the NGPA, will remain regulated indefinitely, with certain ex-
ceptions. 2 Nevertheless, it is estimated that as of 1985, or 1987 if title
I is extended pursuant to NGPA section 122, fifty to sixty percent of
domestic gas production will be exempt from NGPA price controls. 103
D. The Regulatory Origins of Market Disorder
Close examination of the turmoil in the natural gas markets
(2) sales under existing intrastate contracts, id. § 105; (3) sales under rollover contracts, id. § 106;
(4) other categories of natural gas, Id. § 109. See Hollis, supra note 91, § 4D.06 at 7.
97. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
98. All the categories in the second class are eligible only for the monthly inflation adjust-
ment prescribed by NGPA § 101(a), whereas those in the first class are also adjusted by real
growth factors to provide additional incentives for exploration and development, and to phase in
their eventual exemption from title I price ceilings. See infra notes 100-102 and accompanying
text.
99. NGPA § 121(b).
100. Those categories are new natural gas, (as defined by NGPA § 102(c)), natural gas sold for
more than one dollar per million Btu's under" intrastate contracts, and gas from new, onshore
production wells (as defined by NGPA § 103(c)).
101. See id. §§ 121, 122. Gas from new, onshore production wells will be deregulated on Jan.
1, 1985 only if it "is produced from a completion location which is located at a depth of more than
5,000 feet. Id. § 121(a)(2)(B). Shallower production from such wells will not be deregulated until
either July 1, 1987, or at the expiration of price controls reinstated under NGPA § 122(c), which-
ever date is later. Id. § 121(c).
102. Natural gas priced under NGPA § 105 or NGPA § 106 will be deregulated on Jan. 1,
1985 if its price exceeds one dollar per million Btu's and it was not committed to interstate com-
merce before enactment of the NGPA. Id. § 121(a)(3).
103. NGPA ALTERNATIVES, supra note 1, at 3.
[Vol. 18:619
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 4, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss4/3
NATURAL GAS MARKET DISORDER
reveals that it is in fact several distinct but interrelated problems. The
following section outlines several aspects of the turmoil and traces its
roots to the regulatory system to which gas markets are presently
subject.
1. Fly-Up
When the NGPA was enacted, Congress prescribed ceiling prices
for natural gas on the assumption that world crude oil prices would be
no more than eighteen dollars per barrel."°4 Although there has been
some softening in world crude oil prices, there is a substantial likeli-
hood that, under current policy, crude oil prices will be at least thirty
dollars per barrel in 1985.105 As a consequence, many observers fear
that when partial decontrol takes place, gas prices will rise sharply to
the approximate level of oil prices on a Btu-equivalent basis.' 6
A fly-up in gas prices seems less likely now than it has in recent
years. As of this writing, there is some possibility that the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) may collapse, plunging
prices toward the levels envisioned by the authors of the NGPA. °7
However, such a *collapse, while possible, is not considered likely by
some observers.'08 Fly-up therefore remains a possibility of which
policymakers must be aware.
2. Bidding Disparities Between Interstate and Intrastate
Pipelines
Pipelines usually purchase gas from a number of sources at a wide
range of prices. When a pipeline resells gas, the price which the cus-
tomer pays generally reflects the pipeline's weighted average cost of
gas. Accordingly, this "rolled-in" pricing'0 9 allows a pipeline with a
lower weighted average cost of gas to outbid its competitors for new
supplies. Under title I of the NGPA, there are approximately twenty-
seven price categories of gas, ranging from as low as $.27/MMBtu to as
high as $1O/MMBtu for some deregulated gas. Pipelines having access
to old gas, which is subject to controls established under the NGA,
104. See Pannill, Reform of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 17 TULSA L.J. 54, 66 (1981).
105. NGPA ALTERNATIVES, supra note 1, at 9, table 1.
106. Id. at 12-18.
107. See OIL & GAS J., Dec. 27, 1982, at 39.
108. See Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1983, at 3, col. 2.
109. "Rolled-in" pricing averages gas acquisition costs for purposes of calculating the unit
rates to be paid by pipeline customers and ultimate consumers of the gas. 8 H. WILLIAMS & C.
MEYERS, supra note 52, at 653.
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enjoy a "gas cushion" which will permit them to bid the prices of new
gas above market-clearing levels, since the more expensive gas can be
rolled in with less expensive gas and sold to consumers at a competitive
burner-tip price.110
As a result of the gas cushion, interstate pipelines who have
greater access to old gas are able to bid extremely high prices for new
supplies of natural gas, to the detriment of intrastate pipelines. This
trend favors producers of new gas, who can obtain prices in excess of
what would otherwise be market-clearing levels. Moreover, intrastate
pipelines will eventually be forced to curtail deliveries to their custom-
ers if they fail to obtain new supplies of gas before their current sup-
plies are exhausted. Finally, through "off-system sales," interstate
pipelines can sell surplus supplies to customers who had previously
been served by intrastate pipelines.' Thus, the NGPA has not elimi-
nated the artificial distinction between interstate and intrastate sales
created by the NGA, but has merely reversed its negative
consequences.
3. Allocation Inefficiencies
As noted in the preceding section, rolled-in pricing and the wide
range of maximum permissible prices for gas under the NGPA en-
courage pipelines with access to low-cost gas to bid prices above mar-
ket-clearing levels for deregulated gas or gas which qualifies for
incentive pricing. This tendency is enhanced by pipeline rate design.
Prices which pipelines charge are designed to cover costs and to pro-
vide a reasonable return on the estimated quantity of gas to be deliv-
ered." 2 Because a pipeline's fixed costs are allocated both to the
demand and the commodity charges, gas sold up to the original esti-
mate will recover a portion of fixed costs. The commodity charge is not
reduced after fixed costs have been recovered, thus, sales in excess of
the estimated quantity enhance profits. 1 3 Moreover, if low-cost sup-
plies are insufficient to meet demand, pipelines will maximize profits by
purchasing additional supplies at a relatively high cost if no other low-
110. For a thorough discussion of the effect of rolled-in pricing on burner tip rates, see Pierce,
Natural Gas Rate Design: A NeglectedIssue, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1089, 1094-110 (1978).
111. An "off-system sale" is a sale of gas produced by a pipeline company to another pipeline
company. In an "on-system" sale, the producing pipeline transports the gas to the purchaser. City
of Chicago v. Federal Power Comm'n, 458 F.2d 731, 733-34 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1074 (1972).
112. See Pierce, supra note 43, at 83.
113. See id. at 84.
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cost supplies are available."t 4
It is an axiom of microeconomics that the price of a commodity
should equal its marginal cost. " Yet, from the examples given above,
it is apparent that gas consumers pay prices below marginal cost be-
cause the price of new supplies is rolled in with that of old supplies.
Consequently, gas consumption is encouraged since the time and cost
of bringing new supplies to market are understated. If the cost of new
supplies of gas is the weighted average cost rather than the marginal
cost, economic resources have been inefficiently allocated.' 6
4. Apparent Unresponsiveness of Gas Prices to Market Forces
There is little doubt that there is now a "gas glut" in that more gas
can be delivered to purchasers than they are willing to buy at currently
prevailing prices.1 7 Under such circumstances, one would expect the
price of gas to decline until supply and demand were in equilibrium.
However, most available evidence indicates that consumers still face
rapidly escalating gas costs."I8 Consequently, many industrial consum-
ers are switching from natural gas to fuel oil, thereby forcing pipelines
and distributors to recover the high fixed costs by further increasing
prices charged to those residential and commercial customers who can-
not readily shift to alternate energy sources." 9
To a certain extent, this phenomenon may simply be due to the
long lag period during which gas markets respond to price signals, and
to the fact that gas prices are still being set in accordance with escala-
tion provisions that were drafted during the gas shortages of the 1970's.
Also, take-or-pay provisions in long-term contracts may be forcing
pipelines to purchase more expensive supplies from large producers
114. See id.
115. Marginal cost is the avoidable cost that is incurred to produce one more unit of a good or
service. I A. KAHN, supra note 67, at 65.
116. The following hypothetical, adapted from one given by Professor Pierce, demonstrates
this point in greater detail. Suppose that a distributor purchases 100,000 MMBtu of price-con-
trolled gas at $.80/MMBtu when the market price for such gas is actually $2/MMBtu. To meet
the excess demand, it would be rational for the distributor to purchase 20,000 MMBtu of liquefied
natural gas (LNG) at $4.50/MMBtu, since the weighted average cost of all supplies to consumers
would be only $1A3/MMBtu-far below the market level given in the hypothetical. However, the
purchase of the LNG would be rational from society's viewpoint only if consumers would be
willing to pay $4.50/MMBtu in order to increase their consumption of energy by one-fifth. Other-
wise, the consumers would maximize their satisfaction by placing the $90,000 spent on the LNG
into the purchase of other goods and services. See Pierce, supra note 110, at 1098-99.
117. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
118. Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1983, at 3, col. 2.
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while shutting in less expensive gas from smaller producers.' 20 Such a
situation works a hardship not only on consumers but on the shut-in
producers as well. The leases of these producers may expire if produc-
tion is not quickly restored.' 2' Furthermore, the reservoirs under their
leases may be drained by another pipeline taking gas from a different
producer in the same reservoir. Faced with a desperate situation, many
producers are invoking the aid of state common purchaser statutes.' 22
In addition to these explanations, it is also possible that pipeline
rate design and producer price regulations are partly responsible for
the peculiar behavior of the natural gas market. Multiple gas pricing
categories, unequal pipeline access to low-cost gas, and rolled-in pric-
ing are all factors which encourage pipelines to pay above-market
prices for new gas. As a result, their incentive to purchase new, higher-
priced gas is even stronger than it otherwise would be. Moreover, gas
pipelines have little incentive to purchase less expensive supplies since
a dollar-for-dollar passthrough of their costs is virtually guaranteed by
law. 123
IV. PROPOSED MEANS OF ACHIEVING ORDER
Since the disorder in the natural gas markets is actually several
distinct yet interrelated problems, it should come as no surprise to learn
that a number of solutions to these problems have been proposed.' 24
The following section will discuss the most frequently mentioned of
these solutions, categorizing them as being directed primarily either to
120. Id.
121. Once gas is discovered, the lessee has a duty to use due diligence to market the product.
"Satisfaction of the implied marketing obligation through continuing efforts to market the product
will not satisfy the habendum clause indefinitely. At some point, even though there has been no
breach of the covenant [to market], the lease will expire if there is no production." 5 H. WILLIAMS
& C. MEYERS, supra note 52, at 397. But see Bristol v. Colorado Oil & Gas Corp., 225 F.2d 894
(10th Cir. 1955) (lease preserved although no gas had been marketed for seven and two-thirds
years after primary term and nine and a half years from completion date of well; under circum-
stances, lessee had used due diligence to market gas and unreasonable time had not yet elapsed).
122. State common purchaser statutes generally require purchasers to take oil or gas without
discrimination among producers or fields. See, e.g., TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 111.083-.086
(Vernon 1978). However, it would appear that such statutes are pre-empted by the NGA and
hence do not apply to interstate pipelines. Northern Natural Gas Co v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372
U.S. 84, 91 (1963).
123. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
124. The Reagan Administration has drafted a bill designed to alleviate many of the existing
problems in the natural gas markets. S. 615, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The basic provisions
are: (1) deregulation of contracts signed after enactment, with the new price forming a "gas cap"
price until total deregulation in 1986; (2) modification of take-or-pay clauses; (3) an option for
either party to "market-out" or cancel the take-or-pay contracts; (4) limitations on passthrough of
increased gas costs. Id; see Foster Nat. Gas Rep., Mar. 3, 1983, at I (No. 1404).
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producers or to pipelines. Following discussion of these solutions, they
will be evaluated in a brief concluding section.
A. Proposals Affecting Producers
1. Continuation of Wellhead Price Controls
Maintaining price controls on gas is an obvious response to the
disorder in the natural gas markets. Groups claiming to represent resi-
dential and commercial gas consumers have contended that the
NGPA's phased, partial decontrol is the source of the ailment afflicting
the market, pointing to the substantial price increases of the past five
years. 25 Arguments may also be made that the recontrol of gas prices
would end many of the alleged abuses in the purchasing practices of
interstate pipelines by limiting the maximum prices which can be paid
for new supplies.126
As has been shown, however, higher prices are a relatively minor
symptom of the gas market's sickness.'27 Moreover, the consumer ad-
vocates have forgotten all too readily the painful lessons of curtailment,
bureaucracy, and chaos which were taught in the 1970's. While price
controls on essential commodities such as natural gas may be an ac-
ceptable evil in times of emergency, they are generally futile and in-
deed counterproductive for two reasons. First, price controls inevitably
lead to the inefficient allocation of resources and to consumer dissatis-
faction.'28 Second, price controls impose heavy administrative costs on
industry and the public. Government personnel must be assigned to
interpret, administer, and enforce restrictions. Companies must spend
considerable money and time complying with the law, thereby depriv-
ing them of the use of assets that would otherwise be available for pro-
ducing goods and services. Accordingly, the continuation of price
controls offers no significant solution to the problems of the natural gas
markets.
2. Contractual Solutions
The last half of 1982 saw the introduction of many proposals ad-
dressing the so-called "contracts" aspect of the market-ordering prob-
lem. Some of these proposals would merely require all gas purchase
125. Foster Nat. Gas Rep., Dec. 29, 1982, at 1 (No. 1395).
126. Id. at 1-2.
127. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Pierce, supra note 43, at 71-72.
128. Id. at 72.
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contracts to contain "market-out" clauses while others would modify or
even eliminate take-or-pay and indefinite price escalation provisions in
natural gas contracts.12 9 Both types of provisions are seen as having led
to unnecessary consumer price increases. Take-or-pay provisions have
been attacked because they encourage pipelines either to take high-
priced gas or pay up to ninety percent of daily deliverability without
receiving any gas whatsoever. In times of excess demand, the gas wells
of smaller producers with less favorable take-or-pay arrangements, or
none at all, would then be shut-in, even if it were less expensive. Indef-
inite price escalation provisions, on the other hand, provide for steady
increases in gas prices over time, without regard to the ultimate market-
ability of the gas at any particular time. Thus, even when demand
declines, the prices which pipelines pay will continue to rise, ultimately
to be passed through to consumers.
As previously shown,130 both take-or-pay clauses and indefinite
price escalation provisions are essential to insure the financial integrity
of those who produce and explore for natural gas. Moreover, as is true
with respect to other issues in gas policy, there appears to be little relia-
ble data on the effect that these provisions might have on consumers.
In any event, a better approach would appear to be the encouragement
of pipelines and producers alike to renegotiate contracts that no longer
reflect market realities. Finally, there is no reason to believe that legis-
lative tinkering with contractual provisions would resolve problems at-
tributable to natural gas rate design and to the multi-tiered pricing
system which the NGPA mandates.
Incorporating market-out clauses in gas contracts is an attractive
way of protecting consumers from ratchet-like increases in gas prices,
while continuing to afford producers the protection which take-or-pay
and indefinite price escalator clauses may afford. However, the diffi-
culty arises in drafting a suitable market-out provision. In order to
protect producers, the provision must provide reasonable, objective cri-
teria for determining whether gas is marketable and yet must provide
pipelines with some flexibility in making such a determination. Each
pipeline and distributor operates in different local markets which are
subject to different competitive restraints. It would seem virtually im-
possible to design uniform, national standards for market-out provi-
129. See, e.g., Foster Nat. Gas Rep., Dec. 29, 1982, at 2 (No. 1395) (suggesting that all existing
contracts be construed to contain market-out clauses); Notice of Inquiry, 47 Fed. Reg. 19,157,
19,161-62 (1982) (discussing various proposals made to the Commission).
130. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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sions, let alone an actual provision, that could accommodate the wide
range of situations confronting those companies ultimately responsible
for marketing natural gas. Accordingly, market-out provisions can
provide no panacea for gas markets in general.
3. Decontrol of Natural Gas Wellhead Prices
An obvious solution to the problems caused by regulation is sim-
ply to eliminate regulation altogether. Many of the economic ineffi-
ciencies associated with price controls would be eliminated if wellhead
prices were allowed to respond to market conditions. In particular, the
bidding disparities between interstate and intrastate pipelines would be
eliminated; overconsumption of gas would be prevented because con-
sumers could compare the costs of new natural gas supplies with those
of alternate sources of energy; and the administrative costs of adminis-
tering and enforcing price controls could be eliminated.
However, the decontrol of wellhead prices, despite its attractive-
ness, would create additional problems if not supplemented by other
approaches. First, it is possible that there would be a fly-up in gas
prices upon decontrol, due in part to indefinite price escalation
clauses. 131 Although it is difficult to determine precisely how great the
fly-up would be, consumers would undoubtedly be affected, particu-
larly those who had benefited from access to supplies still subject to
"old gas" ceilings. A fly-up would, of course, transfer wealth from con-
sumers to producers and impose heavy burdens on industries which
depend upon natural gas for fuel. Second, deregulation would proba-
bly result in rents, or "windfall profits," to producers of gas previously
subject to price controls. Third, deregulation of wellhead prices would
not necessarily give pipelines any greater incentive to acquire the least
expensive gas supplies; accordingly, the temptation would still be great
for pipelines to obtain new reserves by bidding high prices for them
and then passing the prices through to distributors and ultimately to
consumers. 132
Notwithstanding these objections to immediate decontrol, a possi-
ble remedy may be a gradual, phased decontrol coupled with reforms
in other areas of natural gas regulation and taxation.
131. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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4. Deregulation of Wellhead Prices and Windfall Profit Tax
Immediate deregulation of natural gas prices might result in a
windfall for natural gas producers equal to the difference between the
unregulated price and the price ceiling which had existed prior to de-
regulation, particularly for those who produce "old gas." The most ob-
vious way to relieve a producer of such a windfall is to tax it, a path
which Congress chose when it decontrolled crude oil.133 While no leg-
islation implementing a windfall tax on natural gas has yet been intro-
duced, one might assume that the structure of such legislation would be
similar to that of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax of 1980.134 A tax
on windfall profits is attractive because it would raise much needed
revenue for the federal government while preventing a redistribution of
wealth. A windfall profits tax might also reduce the administrative
burdens associated with a full-fledged price control scheme.
However, although a windfall profits tax would eliminate pro-
ducer rents, it would not resolve problems associated with decontrol.13 5
Moreover, the extremely large number of pricing categories would
make the administration of a windfall tax for gas even more compli-
cated than the windfall tax on crude oil and would lead to the imposi-
tion upon sellers of certification procedures which in many instances
might be far more burdensome than current regulation under the
NGPA. 136 Finally, it is open to dispute that windfalls are an evil which
must somehow be taxed away. The revenues which producers would
receive upon decontrol would presumably be used for financing energy
production, rather than for purchasing personal luxury items. Indeed,
windfall profits serve two important economic functions. First, they
provide the capital necessary for further exploration and development
of energy resources. Second, they allow producers to defray the cur-
rently high costs of replacing reserves which were discovered before the
1970's and which are now nearing exhaustion. 37
133. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4986-4998 (Supp. V 1981).
134. Id.
135. For a discussion of this evidence, see NATURAL GAS REGULATION STUDY, supra note 28,
at 147-49.
136. The economic theory underlying the concept of rents is discussed at some length in
Pierce, supra note 110, at 1099 n.33.
137. For a more detailed discussion of these points, see Eck, Future U.S. Exploration-The
Key Is Economics, OIL & GAs J., Aug. 16, 1982, at 114.
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B. Proposals Affecting Pipelines
1. Encouraging Prudence in Pipeline Gas Acquisitions
A fundamental and recurring problem affecting gas markets is that
under the current regulatory scheme pipelines have little or no incen-
tive to acquire the least expensive gas available. As a result, burner-tip
gas prices have been slow to respond to market forces.
It is at least arguable that FERC has the statutory authority to
encourage pipelines to acquire less expensive sources of gas. Section
601(c)(2) of the NGPA prohibits the passthrough of gas acquisition
costs incurred as a result of "fraud, abuse, or similar grounds."' 38 To
date, FERC has taken a very narrow view of its authority under this
section, stating that it may only disallow costs incurred as a result of
common law fraud. 139
Moreover, FERC appears to have authority under sections 4 and 5
of the NGPA to prohibit the passthrough of gas acquisition costs if
doing so would result in rates which are not "just and reasonable."' 140
Indeed, there have been recent indications that FERC will adopt this
course. In Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. ,141 the Commission announced
its intention to deny passthrough of pipeline gas acquisition costs if it
resulted in a load loss of a pipeline's system, which would occur if cus-
tomers shifted to low-priced alternative fuels. Some pipelines have
taken corrective action on their own initiative and obtained the Com-
mission's consent to reduce their rates to levels necessary to avoid in-
dustrial load loss' 4
2
A slightly different approach has been advocated by those who ar-
gue for allowing pipelines to earn an "incentive rate of return" as a
reward for prudent purchasing practices. Under such a scheme, the
pipeline's return on equity would be "adjusted upward or downward
depending on whether its deregulated gas purchases were below or
above the market-clearing price."'
' 43
While pipelines should be encouraged to keep gas acquisition costs
as low as possible, there is a significant possibility that the Commission
138. NGPA § 601(c)(2).
139. Statement of Policy, 47 Fed. Reg. 6253 (1982).
140. NGPA §§ 4, 5.
141. [21 FERC, Oct.-Dec. 1982 Transfer Binder] FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N REP. (CCH)
61,004, at 61,009 (Oct. 1, 1982).
142. See Foster Nat. Gas Rep., Dec. 29, 1982, at 9 (No. 1395) (discussing the applications of
three pipelines).
143. Notice of Inquiry, 47 Fed. Reg. 19,157, 19,164 (1982) (discussion of the proposal).
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will substitute its own notions of prudence for those of the pipeline
companies' management. This is particularly true since it is difficult to
determine when a pipeline's gas acquisition costs may result in rates
above theoretical market-clearing levels. A miscalculation on the part
of the Commission could lead it to set rates too low, making it impossi-
ble for a pipeline to obtain the reserves necessary to maintain service
on its system. One suspects that it would be better to scrap the entire
elaborate ratemaking apparatus of the NGPA and substitute for it the
discipline of the marketplace itself.
2. Encouraging Marginal Cost Pricing
As previously noted, present natural gas rate designs lead to
burner-tip prices that do not properly reflect the higher marginal cost
of obtaining new supplies.1" Various proposals for implementing mar-
ginal cost pricing have been made, one of which is the incremental
pricing program established by title II of the NGPA. This program is
designed to shift to industrial facilities the cost of acquiring newer,
more expensive supplies of gas. 145 By so doing, the incremental pricing
program is intended primarily to shield residential and commercial
consumers from wellhead price increases and to discourage a fly-up in
the price of high-cost supplies.1 t
In theory, incremental pricing is essentially identical to marginal
cost pricing. However, the NGPA program is not a true marginal cost
pricing mechanism because it confronts only industrial consumers with
the variable costs of purchasing an additional unit of gas and not resi-
dential and commercial consumers.' 47 Also, the NGPA's incremental
pricing program requires that industrial consumers pay a rate which
reflects the average cost of transporting, storing, and distributing a unit
of gas, as well as its marginal cost. Such a requirement is inconsistent
with marginal cost pricing since the fixed costs of transportation and
distribution cannot be avoided by deciding not to produce or not to
purchase the last unit of output.148
Professor Pierce has identified three possible methods of bringing
natural gas rate design into accord with the principles of marginal cost
144. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
145. Moody & Garten, The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978: Analysis & Over'iew, 25 RocKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 2-1, 2-41 to -42 (1979).
146. Id.
147. Pierce, supra note 110, at 1120.
148. Id. at 1122.
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pricing. 149 However, he recognizes that each method suffers from ana-
lytical and institutional defects which, while perhaps not insurmounta-
ble, are nonetheless formidable.150 Like many good theories, marginal
cost pricing presents far too many difficulties in application to be hailed
as a panacea for ailing gas markets.
3. Imposing Common Carrier Duties Upon Pipelines
A proposal which has been considered more carefully is to elimi-
nate utility regulation of pipelines in favor of common carrier regula-
tion. At common law, common carriers had a duty to carry goods for
all persons at non-discriminatory rates.' 5 ' Oil pipelines have tradition-
ally been regulated as common carriers and so it would not be unprece-
dented to treat gas pipelines in that manner.
52  1
As applied to the natural gas industry, gas would be transported
by pipelines for a fee, its services available to all wishing to avail them-
selves of the service. Pipelines could move gas from producers to dis-
tributors or, like many oil pipelines, they could ship their own gas to
distributors and serve other producers on a space available basis. 53
Some have observed that common carrier regulation could in-
crease competition and facilitate the more rapid movement of gas in
response to market conditions.' 5 4 On the other hand, such regulation
would also raise questions about access, 1-5 pipeline revenue stability,156
and rate discrimination, particularly in connection with transportation
of a pipeline's own production.157 Also, producers might be reluctant
to deal with small distributors except at very high prices because of the
minor gas volumes involved.1 5 8 Moreover, the serpentine history of the
oil pipeline industry suggests that common carrier regulation of gas
pipelines, however attractive it may be in principle, would be as troub-
149. Id. at 1138-47. These methods are: (I) inclining block rates; (2) marginal cost pricing
with consumer rebates; and (3) marginal cost pricing with an excess profits tax. Id.
150. Id. at 1147-62.
151. See Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 162 U.S. 184, 197
(1896).
152. See United States v. Ohio Oil Co., 234 U.S. 548,560 (1914); 4 W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF
OIL & GAS 321-25 (1962).
153. See NATURAL GAS REGULATION STUDY, supra note 28, at 158.
154. Id. at 161.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 159-61.
157. For instance, the issue would arise whether a pipeline could give its own gas priority
during periods of "pipeline shortages." If pipelines do have that right, then questions of whether a
pipeline owns the gas produced by a subsidiary become important.
158. See NATURAL GAs REGULATION STUDY, supra note 28, at 160-61.
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lesome as it would be beneficial for gas markets.5 9
Furthermore, the transition from utility to common carrier regula-
tion would be extraordinarily complex. Commitments under present
long-term gas purchase contracts would have to be limited or abro-
gated altogether-raising fifth amendment issues of taking property-
in order to free available pipeline capacity. Procedures for obtaining
access to existing pipeline capacity and for constructing new capacity
would have to be devised and the question of divesting pipelines of
producing properties requiring transportation through their lines would
have to be considered closely. 60 The means by which the transition
from utility to common carrier regulation is made must be carefully
designed if gas markets are not to be thrown into complete confusion.
C. Some Tentative Suggestionsfor Reform
It would be naive to imagine that economic problems are ever
solved as one would solve an equation or a puzzle. Moreover, it would
be impossible within the confines of this Article to set forth a compre-
hensive solution to the disorder in the natural gas markets. Construing
lengthy statutes on a daily basis produces a healthy skepticism about
the possibility of working out the details of any major proposal in a few
short pages. Moreover, the difficulty of obtaining data about gas mar-
kets and in making empirical determinations about conditions in them
make any proposals other than the most general extremely hazardous.
With these caveats in mind, it is suggested that deregulation of well-
head prices and a revision of FERC's role would be substantial pro-
gress towards rationality in the natural gas markets.
1. Deregulation of Wellhead Prices
A key cause of the disorder in the natural gas markets is the regu-
lation of wellhead prices. As demonstrated previously in this Article,
such regulation distorts market demand and is economically ineffi-
cient.' 6' The dangers of a fly-up in natural gas prices upon decontrol,
while not negligible, have lessened considerably over recent months. 162
Any danger of such a fly-up could be eliminated by legislation that
would freeze natural gas prices and suspend the operation of indefinite
159. See 4 W. SUMMERS, supra note 152, at 321-25.
160. NATURAL GAS REGULATION STUDY, supra note 28, at 163.
161. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
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price escalation clauses for a 90 or 120 day period pending market sta-
bilization. Current market conditions would likely encourage a general
reduction in prices that would be in the best interests of consumers
while ensuring rationality in gas markets.
2. Pipeline Regulation
The time has come to rethink the fundamental premises underly-
ing pipeline regulation. For some time, it has been evident that pipe-
lines are not pure natural monopolies, largely because the alternative
fuel capabilities of large industrial consumers effectively limit the
prices which they can be charged. Moreover, the current regulatory
scheme does little to encourage pipelines to acquire the least expensive
supplies of gas. Accordingly, it may be time to consider whether pipe-
lines should be deregulated altogether.
Such a course would afford pipelines the flexibility they will need
in responding to the pricing instability that wellhead. decontrol may
bring. Pipeline deregulation would also remove artificial ceilings cur-
rently in effect on transportation fees, thereby encouraging pipelines to
carry gas for producers without the necessity of implementing a com-
plicated common carrier arrangement. Finally, deregulation would al-
low successful pipelines to reap the rewards of good service while
punishing poorly managed pipelines for their improvidence.
There are dangers in such a course. Pipelines might avoid markets
with a heavy residential load, since the cost of serving them would be
too great when compared with the demand. Also, pipelines might sub-
sidize industrial customers with low rates while charging their fixed
costs to commercial and residential consumers, who lack alternative
fuel capability.
A feasible solution to the problem might be to redefine FERC's
role from rate-setter to referee. Pipelines could be allowed to charge
what the market would bear for their services, provided that their rates
were not unduly discriminatory and that they maintained service to
their customers without curtailment. The details of such an arrange-
ment would be most difficult to work out, yet the effort might be
worthwhile.
V. CONCLUSION
It would be easy to conclude by restating the obvious: that the
problems in the natural gas market are complex, that gas markets are
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inscrutable in their complexity, and that, even to the wisest, no clear-
cut answers are available. Such observations are neither controversial
nor satisfying, and would convey no sense of the importance of the
crisis that is upon us or of how critical it is that some attempt be made
to improve a situation that has impaired the welfare of millions,
whether they were aware of it or not. This Article has attempted to
state the problem and to outline some possible solutions. The impor-
tant part-working out the provisions of a practicable solution-lies in
the province of the statesman, not the scholar.
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